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The EC Merger Control Regulation
By PHILIPPE DE SMEDT*
and GEORGES VANDERSANDEN**
I. INTRODUCTION
The merger control regulation (Regulation) of the European Com-
munities (EC) was formally adopted by the EC Council on December 21,
1989.1 This ended many months of speculation as to the prospects of the
Regulation's final adoption, as well as to its final form. This Article does
not represent an exhaustive analysis of the Regulation. Rather, the Arti-
cle outlines the history of merger control in the EC, describes the more
important elements of the Regulation and notes some of the more inter-
esting questions raised by it.
II. BACKGROUND
Prior to the Regulation, the EC Commission relied on articles 85
and 86 of the EC Treaty,2 the two traditional instruments of merger con-
trol. Article 85 and 86 cases have been the principal sources of EC anti-
trust law. Article 85 is broadly drafted and applies generally to
anticompetitive agreements and decisions.3 Article 86 applies only to
cases in which an abuse of a dominant position within the Common Mar-
ket has occurred.4 There is much case law on the meaning of a "domi-
nant position." The definition of dominant position in the leading case of
United Brands Company v. EEC Commission is given at Section II(A)
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1. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21/12/89 on the control of concentrations
between undertakings, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 395) 1 (1989) [hereinafter Regulation].
2. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 1988 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
47 (Cmd. 455) 82, 107-08 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] (original version at 298 U.N.T.S. 11).
3. Id.
4. Id at 107.
5. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 207.
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below. Until now, article 86 has been the Commission's chief instrument
for merger control.
A. History of the Use of Articles 85 and 86 for Merger Control
The Commission Memorandum on Concentrations of 19666 (1966
Memorandum) represents the first landmark in the history of the appli-
cation of articles 85 and 86 to merger control. In the 1966 Memoran-
dum, the Commission defined its position on the application of articles
85 and 86 to corporate acquisitions. The 1966 Memorandum distin-
guished between a "concentration" (encompassing mergers and acquisi-
tions) and a mere "agreement" between companies. While the
memorandum stated that it was sometimes difficult to distinguish be-
tween an agreement and a concentration, it declared that concentrations
were essentially proprietary in nature, but might result from less than
total ownership of a company.7 The 1966 Memorandum concluded that
article 85 did not apply to concentrations, while article 86, which prohib-
ited the abuse of a dominant position, did apply to concentrations.
In 1972 the Commission confirmed that article 86 extended to con-
centrations in the case of Europemballage & Continental Can Company v.
EEC Commission8 (Continental Can) [appeal before the European Court
of Justice (ECJ)]. Continental Can, the leading case in article 86 juris-
prudence in the context of concentrations, firmly established that article
86 applies to a company in a dominant position that acquires a competi-
tor even though article 86 itself contains no express provision to this
effect. 9
Continental Can Company, Inc., of New York, which had previ-
ously acquired control of a German manufacturer of light metal pack-
ages, acquired its Dutch license in 1970. In Continental Can, the ECJ
held that an acquiring company abuses its dominant position when it
fetters competition to such an extent that the only undertakings that re-
main in the market are dependent on the dominant one.10 However, in
subsequent article 86 cases, the test for "abuse" has become less strin-
gent. An abuse is now defined as an action that hinders the maintenance
6. Memorandum on the problem of concentrations in the Common Market, Competition
Series, Study No. 3 (Brussels 1966).
7. Id. § 51.
8. Europemballage Corp. & Continental Can Co. v. EEC Commission, 1973 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 215, 243-45.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 244-45.
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of the degree of competition in the market.1" The subsequent article 86
cases have not involved mergers. However, the Commission has repeat-
edly stated that it will apply a similar test in merger cases, a policy that
presumably will be carried forward in its application of the Regulation.12
The classic test of whether an acquiring company enjoys a dominant
position ab initio was enunciated by the ECJ in the case of United Brands
Company v. EEC Commission.13 In United Brands, the ECJ defined
dominance as "a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertak-
ing which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on
the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable
extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of its
consumers." 
14
The United Brands test refers to the "relevant market." The rele-
vant market consists of two components, the relevant product market as
well as the relevant geographic market. 5 Prior to the Commission's de-
cision in the case of Pilkington/BSN-Gervais-Danone16 (Pilkington/
BSN), it was thought that article 86 did not apply when a company,
dominant in a limited geographical sphere, attempted to extend that
dominance geographically. However, when the French conglomerate
BSN attempted to sell its flat glass division to the United Kingdom glass
manufacturer Pilkington, the Commission ruled that the prospective sale
violated article 86 since it strengthened Pilkington's position in the
United Kingdom and extended Pilkington's dominance into another geo-
graphic area.
British American Tobacco Company and R.J Reynolds Industries v.
EEC Commission 17 (Philip Morris) extended the reach of article 86. In
Philip Morris, the cigarette manufacturer Philip Morris agreed to acquire
a thirty per cent interest in its competitor, Rothmans, from its South
African parent company, Rembrandt. The Commission exempted this
proposed acquisition of a competitor and the ECJ upheld the Commis-
sion's decision despite a challenge by two other tobacco companies, Brit-
11. United Brands Co. v. EEC Commission, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 207; see also
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. EEC Commission, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. . Rep. 461, 520.
12. See, eg., EEC COMM'N, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY para. 150, at 104
(1981).
13. 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 207; see also NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Miche-
lin v. EEC Commission, 1983 E. Comm. J. Rep. 3461, 3501-03.
14. United Brands Co., 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 227.
15. Id. at 270-77.
16. Pilkington/BSN-Gervais-Danone, in EEC COMM'N, supra note 12, paras. 152-54, at
105-06.
17. British American Tobacco Co. v. EEC Commission, 1987 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 4487.
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ish American Tobacco and R.J. Reynolds. In the past, the Commission
had consistently held that an abuse of a dominant position could only
occur if there was a change in control within the target company. In
Philip Morris, however, the ECJ stated in dicta that article 86 not only
applied to the acquisition of both legal and de facto control, but also
applied when the acquisition of a substantial stake gave the acquiring
company influence over the commercial policy of the target company.
The Philip Morris case is better known for being the first case in which
the ECJ considered that article 85 in addition to article 86 might apply to
the acquisition of a minority interest by a competitor if the acquiring
company gains substantial influence over the target company.
Application of articles 85 and 86 to mergers and acquisitions will
not automatically cease with the adoption of the Regulation. The juris-
prudence of articles 85 and 86 will influence the Commission in its appli-
cation of the Regulation and the ECJ will undoubtedly use such
jurisprudence in conjunction with the Regulation in reviewing the Com-
mission's future decisions. Nevertheless, the precise role of articles 85
and 86 in European mergers remains uncertain now that the Regulation
has been adopted.
B. Reasons for the Adoption of the Regulation
The Commission pressed for the adoption of the Regulation for four
main reasons. First, the Commission wanted exclusive jurisdiction over
the large European mergers and acquisitions, those with a "Community
dimension." To have a single European market, the Commission be-
lieved that Member States should not be able individually to block signif-
icant mergers and acquisitions of European companies. Therefore, one
intention of the Regulation is to provide a "one stop shop" that requires
only that the Commission in Brussels be satisfied (on competition
grounds) that a proposed merger or acquisition should proceed.1 8
The need for a prior clearance procedure provides a second reason
for the adoption of the Regulation. Often, the Commission intervened on
the basis of article 86 very late in the transaction. The uncertainty pro-
duced by such ex post facto intervention was unsatisfactory to the busi-
ness community. The Regulation provides a simple and well-defined
procedure to obtain prior clearance for large European mergers and ac-
18. However, Member States are permitted under the Regulation to intervene on certain
limited non-competition grounds and also when there exists a detrimental effect upon competi-
tion within an internal market of the given Member State, and that market represents a "dis-
tinct market." See Regulation, supra note 1, art. 9, at 7.
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quisitions. 19 Third, with the adoption of the Regulation, it is understood
that the Commission hopes to obtain forty new executives to handle the
work, a feature of great political attraction to the Commission.
The existence of substantive defects in the pre-existing law provided
the final reason for the Regulation's adoption. Article 86, unlike United
States antitrust law, does not prevent monopolies when two nondomi-
nant companies combine to form a dominant enterprise. However, the
Regulation is intended to prevent the monopolization process. Also, arti-
cle 86 probably does not prevent a nondominant company from acquir-
ing a dominant company. The principal test of the Regulation not only
prevents the enhancement of pre-existing dominance, but prevents the
creation and the strengthening of a dominant position. Therefore, the
acquisition of a dominant company by a nondominant one appears to be
conceptually within the scope of the Regulation.20
I. THE REGULATION
A. The Scope of the Regulation
Two concepts define the scope of the Regulation: The Regulation
applies to "concentrations" having a "Community dimension" (article 1).
1. Community dimension
Under article 1, the Regulation only applies to mergers having a
"Community dimension." Community dimension is defined in terms of
sales.2" The Regulation applies when three conditions are fulfilled: (1)
The aggregate worldwide sales of all the companies exceeds ECU 2 5,000
million; (2) the aggregate Community-wide sales of at least two of the
companies exceeds ECU 250 million; (3) each of the companies cannot
exceed more than two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide sales
within one and the same Member State. 3 These conditions will be re-
vised in four years after the Regulation enters into force.24
Sales are calculated by adding together the sales of all goods and
services within the companies' ordinary activities, deducting sales rebates
and value added tax, and deducting other taxes directly related to sales in
19. Id. arts. 4, 6, 7, at 4-5, 6.
20. See infra text in Section III(A).
21. The Regulation actually refers to "turnover" which is the English accounting term
employed by the EC for "sales." See Regulation, supra note 1, at 1.
22. An ECU represents the average of a basket of currencies. On Feb. 21, 1990, 1 ECU
- 1.22 United States dollars.
23. Id art. 1(2), at 3.
24. Id art. 9(10), at 7.
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the preceding financial year.25 If only a portion of an enterprise is in-
volved, even if it is not a legal entity, only that portion of the sales will be
included in the calculation.26 Banks and financial institutions are subject
to different rules. Rather than by sales, the measure is calculated on one-
tenth of their assets according to a special formula.27 For insurance com-
panies, the equivalent of sales for purposes of these calculations shall be
based on the value of premiums received.28
2. Concentrations
The Regulation also applies to "concentrations." A concentration is
deemed to occur when: (1) two or more previously independent compa-
nies merge, or (2) one or more persons, already controlling at least one
company, acquire direct or indirect control of the whole or parts of one
or more companies, whether by purchase of securities or assets, by con-
tract, or by any other means.29
"Control" is defined as rights, contracts, or any other means which,
separately or jointly, can exercise decisive influence on a company. 30 Ex-
amples of control under article 3 of the Regulation illustrate that the
acquisition of a majority interest in a company is not necessary for
control.31
When banks or financial institutions acquire shares in a company for
the purpose of selling them, it does not constitute control of that com-
pany, provided that the acquiring institution does not exercise voting
rights with a view toward determining the competitive behavior of the
company.32
When the only purpose of the operation is to coordinate the compet-
itive behavior of independent companies, it will not be considered a con-
centration.33 However, an agreement to coordinate behavior might fall
under article 85 and thus infringe EC competition law. A joint venture
permanently functioning as an autonomous economic entity will be
treated as a concentration unless its purpose is to coordinate the competi-
tive behavior between the companies.34
25. Id. art. 5(3)(a), at 5.
26. Id. art. 5(2).
27. Id. art. 5(3)(a).
28. Id. art. 5(3)(b).
29. Id. art. 3(1)(a), (b), at 4.
30. Id. art. 3(3).
31. Id. art. 3.
32. Id. art. 3(5)(a).
33. Id. art. 3(2).
34. Id.
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B. The Test
Article 2 describes how the Commission will analyze a proposed
merger or acquisition. The article 2(3) test (Test) states: "A concentra-
tion which creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which
effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common mar-
ket or in a substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the
common market. '35
C. Procedure
One of the most important features of the Regulation is its prior
notification procedure. This involves completing an extensive form very
similar to the United States procedure known as a "Hart-Scott-Rodino
filing."' 36 The relevant parties must notify the Commission one week af-
ter the conclusion of an agreement or after "the announcement of the
public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest., 37
The Regulation allows the Commission one month from the receipt
of a complete notification to determine whether the proposed concentra-
tion has a Community dimension and whether it raises sufficiently seri-
ous competition issues to require further investigation.38 If, after the one
month period, the Commission decides to conduct further investigations
to determine if the proposed transaction violates competition laws under
article 2, such investigations may extend another four months. 39 There-
fore, a transaction may be suspended for a maximum of five months fol-
lowing a complete notification before the Commission makes a final
decision.
The Regulation grants the Commission the power to veto a pro-
posed merger." When a merger has already been implemented, the
Commission may require the merged companies or assets to be sepa-
rated.4" The Commission may also order the cessation of joint control,
or require any other action that may be appropriate in order to restore
conditions of effective competition.42
35. Id. art. 2(3) (emphasis added).
36. Title II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 requires pre-
merger notification of certain direct and indirect mergers or acquisitions to the FTC and to the
Justice Department. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18a (West 1976)(amended).
37. Regulation, supra note 1, art. 4(1), at 4.
38. Id. arts. 6(1)(c), 10(1), at 6, 8.
39. Id. art. 10(3), at 8.
40. Id. art. 8(3), at 6.
41. Id. art. 8(4).
42. Id.
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The Regulation does not give the Commission the power to impede
public bids, provided that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights
attached to the securities on which he is bidding.4 3 An acquirer may
only exercise those voting rights in order to maintain the full value of
those investments and only if a derogation has been granted by the
Commission.'
D. Retention of Jurisdiction by Member States
The Regulation allows Member States to apply their own competi-
tion laws and procedures to a merger or acquisition in two types of situa-
tions.45 Additionally, in a third type of situation a Member State may
intervene on the basis of non-competition grounds.46
If a me'ger or acquisition either does not exceed the relevant sales
thresholds, or is so concentrated in one Member State that it constitutes
a domestic transaction rather than a transaction with a Community di-
mension as defined by the Regulation, then that Member State may pro-
cess the merger or acquisition under its own national laws.47
Furthermore, under article 9, the so-called "German Clause," the
Commission has the authority to allow a Member State to examine a
transaction when the Member State has convinced the Commission that
the proposed transaction will have a detrimental effect on competition
within a section of the domestic market that represents a distinct market
of the given Member State." However, the Regulation also provides that
the Commission may refuse to transfer the matter to the Member State in
question and to continue to process such a transaction.49
Article 21(3) gives the Member States the right to take appropriate
measures when necessary to protect legitimate interests not otherwise
protected by the Regulation.50 The legitimate interests that Member
States may protect include national security, pluralism of the media, and
prudential rules applying to financial institutions.5 " A Member State
may invoke other legitimate interests, but only with the approval of the
Commission. 2
43. Id. art. 7(3).
44. Id. art. 7(4).
45. Id. art. 9, at 7.
46. Id. art. 21(3), at 11.
47. Id. art. 9(3)(b), at 7.
48. Id.
49. Id. art. 9(3)(a).
50. Id. art. 21(3), at 11.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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Member States invoke the principle of media pluralism to prevent
undesirable entities from dominating any organ of the media. Similarly,
"prudential rules applying to financial institutions" are the national rules
of the Member States that prevent undesirable entities from gaining con-
trol of financial institutions.
V. COMMENTARY
It is not possible to provide a complete analysis of the Regulation in
this Article. Instead, a brief discussion of two of the more interesting
questions raised by the Regulation follows.
A. How Does the Test Alter the Substantive EC Law of Merger
Control?
The most engaging question raised by the Regulation is how its arti-
cle 2(3) test will alter the substantive law of EC merger control.53 There
will be no clear answer to this question until the Commission has
processed several notifications and the ECJ has reviewed some Commis-
sion decisions. The Regulation expressly gives the ECJ the right to re-
view all Commission decisions under article 21(l).14 However, an
understanding of why the Commission adopted the Regulation reveals
clues of how they will likely interpret it.
It is fairly certain that the requirement of an abuse of a pre-existing
dominant position under article 86 has been abandoned.55 The Test now
includes transactions that create a dominant position.56 Therefore, the
Regulation applies to a situation in which two nondominant companies
in the same geographic and product market combine to form a single
dominant enterprise. This represents a significant change in EC competi-
tion law and brings it in line with United States antitrust law. Also the
Test probably applies when a nondominant company acquires a domi-
nant company in the same market, since the acquirer will be transformed
from a non-dominant company into a dominant one.
The principal Test was more broadly stated in previous drafts of the
proposed Regulation and would have given the Commission an even
broader scope for blocking potentially anticompetitive mergers. For ex-
ample, in the draft of November 30, 1988,17 article 2 contained the lan-
53. See id. art. 2(3), at 4.
54. Id. art. 21(1), at 11.
55. See EEC Treaty, supra note 2, art. 86, at 107-08.
56. Regulation, supra note 1, art. 2(3), at 4.
57. Amended proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) on the control of concentrations
between undertakings, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 22) 14 (1989).
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guage: "Concentrations which create or strengthen a position as a result
of which the maintenance or development of effective competition is im-
peded in the common market or in a substantial part thereof shall be
declared incompatible with the common market.
58
Thus, the earlier proposal did not require the creation of a dominant
position. Commentators characterized this earlier test as involving the
strengthening, or creation of, a strong market position as opposed to a
dominant one.59
The return to the use of the term "dominant position" in article 2 of
the Regulation probably indicates a desire for continuity with article 86
and merely broadens the scope of prior substantive anti-competition law
rather than replaces it. Thus, although the earlier draft of the Test was
vague, article 86 may now help define a "dominant position."
B. Jurisdiction
The Regulation raises another question: how will the competition
authorities of Member States react to the usurpation of their jurisdiction
over mergers or acquisitions that have a Community dimension? The
Regulation clearly grants the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over
mergers or acquisitions having a Community dimension except in the
three circumstances outlined in Section III of this Article. Article 21(2)
states unequivocally: "No Member State shall apply its national legisla-
tion on competition to any concentration that has a Community
dimension. "60
Generally, the Regulation applies only to competition questions and
does not affect those national laws, rules, and procedures of Member
States that pertain to mergers and acquisitions unrelated to competition.
However, there are at least two exceptions to the general principle. First,
national procedures relating to public bids will probably be amended to
address the EC prior clearance procedure introduced by the Regulation.
Second, as mentioned before, article 21(3) of the Regulation permits
Member States to veto a proposed merger or acquisition in order to pro-
tect legitimate interests.6 '
58. Id. art. 2(3), at 16 (emphasis added).
59. See, e.g., Intervention of Mr. Phillippe Chappatte, Partner, Slaughter & May,
London, at Seminar on Mergers and Acquisitions Law within the EC, London Marriott Hotel
(June 26-27, 1989).
60. Regulation, supra note I, art. 21(2), at 11.
61. See id. art. 21(3). Previous proposals for the Regulation would have permitted the
Commission to allow an anticompetitive merger or acquisition on certain noncompetition
grounds, for example, the creation of "super" European companies to compete more effec-
tively with large American and Japanese companies. However, this idea was dropped, and the
[Vol. 13
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Besides the stated exceptions, there are at least three situations in
which the Commission's attempts to obtain exclusive jurisdiction may be
challenged. These three situations test the motivation and desire of
Member States to create a truly "one stop shop" administrative hurdle in
the completion of a large merger or acquisition.
The first situation, arising under article 6(1)(b), is one in which the
Commission performs its preliminary investigation and determines that,
although a concentration may fall within the scope of the Regulation, it
does not raise serious anticompetition problems.62 In such a situation,
the Commission will not oppose the proposed transaction and will de-
clare it compatible with the common market.63 If the Commission truly
has exclusive jurisdiction under article 21(2) of the Regulation, there
should be no further competition issues to consider. Unfortunately, at
least one national competition authority has expressed the view that the
Bundeskartellamt in Germany, the Ministre des Finances in France, and
the Office of Fair Trading in the United Kingdom could intervene at this
juncture and apply their own national competition rules and possibly
veto the transaction. Such intervention would make a mockery of the
"one stop shop" concept.
Similarly, if the Commission clears a merger or acquisition after a
full three to four month investigation, as per article 8(2), 4 the Regula-
tion provides that the companies involved are then free to complete the
transaction. 65 However, even in this situation, the Office of Fair Trading
in the United Kingdom expressed the view that it has the right to inter-
vene, and possibly veto, the acquisition of a United Kingdom company
on competition grounds even after the Commission has given its
approval.
Finally, a Member State may veto a Commission-approved merger
or acquisition on grounds other than the legitimate interests permitted
under article 21(3). The final paragraph of Article 21(3) states:
Any other public interest must be communicated to the Commission
Commission's analysis is mostly limited under the Regulation to competition considerations
alone. An exception, contained in article 2, mentions as a consideration "the development of
technical and economic progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form
an obstacle to competition." Id. art. 2(1)(b), at 3 (emphasis added). Thus one might, for exam-
ple, envisage the Commission sanctioning the merger of large European silicon chip manufac-
turers on less than strictly "competition" grounds if it benefits the European silicon chip
industry as a whole.
62. Id. art. 6(1)(b), at 6.
63. Id.
64. Regulation, supra note 1, art. 8(2), at 6.
65. Id.
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by the Member State concerned and shall be recognized by the Com-
mission after an assessment of its compatibility with the general princi-
ples and other provisions of Community law before the measures
referred to above may be taken. The Commission shall inform the
Member State concerned of its decision within one month of that
communication. 6
6
It is not completely clear what would happen if the Commission
failed to recognize the alleged public interest of the Member State, and
the Member State subsequently chose to ignore the Commission's
opinion.
In summary, the success of a "one stop shop" depends on the atti-
tude and goodwill of the relevant authorities of the Member States.
Without this cooperation, the Regulation simply will become an addi-
tional obstacle to large mergers and acquisitions and will deter major
restructuring among large European companies. Thus, the Regulation
will hinder, rather than help, the drive toward a single European market.
C. Problems of Interpretation of the Regulation
As with any major new piece of legislation, the Regulation contains
many ambiguous clauses, which will only be clarified as the Commission
processes a number of notifications and a body of ECJ case law develops.
This Article merely mentions a few of the possible problem areas. How-
ever, it should be noted that the Commission is apparently drafting an
implementing regulation that supplements the merger control regulation.
This implementing regulation is supposed to deal with inter alia notifica-
tions, calculation of time limits, and hearings. Therefore, some of the
ambiguities mentioned below may be clarified by the implementing
regulation.
Article 5 of the Regulation contains the formulas for the calculation
of sales to determine whether a proposed transaction possesses a Com-
munity dimension. 67 Article 5(4) provides a fairly elaborate description
of the parts of a large company's empire that must be included in the
calculation of sales.6' Depending on whether or not they want the Com-
mission to review the proposed transaction, some companies may employ
creative accounting. For example, an acquiror may decide that its
chances of acquiring a target company are increased if the Commission,
rather than the relevant national authorities, reviews the transaction.
66. Regulation, supra note 1, art. 21(3), at 11.
67. Id. art. 5, at 5-6.
68. Id.
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During the course of the investigation, a great deal of correspondence as
well as arguments over accounting principles may be expected between
the Commission and the companies.
Another problem for companies is ascertaining the correct time to
notify the Commission of the proposed merger or takeover. Article 4(1)
states:
Concentrations with a Community dimension as referred to by this
Regulation shall be notified to the Commission not more than one
week after the conclusion of the agreement, or the announcement of
the public bid, or the acquisition of a controlling interest. That week
shall begin when the first of those events occurs. 6 9
While the announcement of a public bid is a definite point in time,
the other events are not. For example, in a friendly deal it is often diffi-
cult to determine exactly when an agreement has been concluded. Does
conclusion mean the point when an oral agreement has been reached,
when the agreement has been reduced to writing, or when the transaction
has been completed? Notification must occur no later than one week
after the acquisition of a controlling interest, assuming that the meaning
of "controlling interest" under article 3 is understood.
With legislation as complex as the Regulation, unintentional incon-
sistencies are inevitable. For example, article 10(1) states that the Com-
mission's decision whether or not to proceed with a full investigation
must be made within one month from the date of the receipt of a com-
plete notification.7' However, article 7, which deals with the suspension
of mergers, states that a merger may take effect either before its notifica-
tion, or within the first three weeks following its notification. 71 There-
fore, if the Commission is slow to issue a decision following its
preliminary investigation, a window of as much as one week exists when
the companies involved may proceed with the merger or acquisition
before the Commission makes a preliminary decision. Of course, the
companies take the risk that the Commission will proceed with a full
investigation and ultimately prohibit the merger. The parties would then
be faced with the complication and expense of unwinding the entire
transaction.
D. The Effect of the Regulation upon United States Corporations
The Regulation contains possible advantages as well as disadvan-
69. Id art. 4(1), at 4.
70. Id. art. 10(l), at 8.
71. Id. art. 7(1), at 6.
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tages for American corporations. One possible advantage is that a large
American corporation that wishes to establish itself in the EC by
purchasing a large European corporation might escape the requirement
of notifying the Commission if its aggregate Community-wide turnover is
less than ECU 250 million.72 This is likely if the corporation has not
previously concentrated on the European market. Thus, large American
corporations may gain a competitive advantage over their European ri-
vals in the acquisition of a desirable European target company. Of
course, this advantage may turn into a disadvantage if the American cor-
poration must instead satisfy the national competition authority of the
Member State of the target company. Member States may be more prone
to veto an acquisition than the Commission due to nationalistic
considerations.
Additionally, article 24 of the Regulation contains a "reciprocity
clause" regarding relations with non-EC countries.7 3 The reciprocity
clause requires the Commission to negotiate with non-EC countries if
there is evidence of discrimination against EC companies attempting to
acquire target companies in that non-EC State.74 If future negotiations
occur between the EC and the United States, the politically astute United
States corporation should realize that it might have greater difficulty in
obtaining clearance from the Commission under the Regulation than it
had before under articles 85 and 86. However, at present this is not a
serious concern for American corporations, given the current liberal
takeover climate in the United States.
V. CONCLUSION
As this Article was being written, Czechoslovakia obtained its first
democratically elected noncommunist president in fifty years75 and the
Romanian dictator Nicholae Ceausescu was overthrown.76 Such events
in Eastern Europe dwarfed the EC merger control regulation; neverthe-
less, it is a very important piece of EC legislation. Depending upon the
attitude of the authorities of Member States, the Regulation will either
severely hinder the creation of large pan-European companies by creat-
ing additional roadblocks, or will assist it by creating the desired "one
72. Id. art. 1(2)(b), at 2.
73. Id. art. 24, at 12.
74. Id. art. 24(3).
75. See, e.g., Czechoslovak Leader Announces Amnesty, Chicago Trib., Jan. 2, 1990, at Cl.
76. See World Capitals Revel in Dictator's Downfall, Washington Post, Dec. 23, 1989, at
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stop shop." Hopefully, Member States will adhere to the momentous
spirit of the times and facilitate the latter course.

